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The Ability of Pennsylvania School
Districts to Permanently Replace Striking
Teachers
I. Introduction
During the summer of 1988, the West Shore Area School Dis-
trict (School District or District) and the West Shore Area Educa-
tion Association (Union) engaged in a labor dispute over their cur-
rent collective bargaining agreement. The Union threatened to strike
if its demand for increased compensation above the current contract
terms was not met before the beginning of the 1988 school term.'
The School District threatened that the teachers would be perma-
nently replaced if the teachers actually went on strike under the con-
tract.' The School District subsequently placed advertisements in lo-
cal papers requesting applications for teaching positions.' The Union
contended that the School District did not have the right to replace
the teachers and that the Union had the right to strike in an effort to
advance its bargaining position.4
On August 30, 1988, approximately 367 teachers in the West
Shore Area School District went on strike.5 Immediately after the
strike commenced, the School District attempted to enjoin the strike
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County.6 Judge Ed-
1. Harrisburg Patriot, Aug. 30, 1988, at A2, col. 3.
2. Harrisburg Patriot, Aug. 25, 1988, at BI, col. 1. The collective bargaining agreement,
which remained in force until August 31, 1991, provided for "reopening" of wage negotiations
for certain salaries and benefits after August 31, 1988. The entire agreement was covered by a
"no-strike" clause providing that
under no circumstances shall the Association or any employee, individually or
collectively, cause, permit or take part in any strike, sitdown, slowdown, picket-
ing, stayin, limitation, curtailment or restriction of production or interference
with work in or about the Board's school system or in the movement of goods,
materials or persons in or about the Board's school system and any place outside
of the Board's school system.
West Shore Collective Bargaining Agreement 21 (Aug. 31, 1985) (copy on file at the Dickin-
son Law Review office),
3. Harrisburg Patriot, Aug. 25, 1988, at BI, col. 1. The advertisements requested indi-
viduals to replace striking union members.
4. WSE Bargaining News Alert I (Aug. 26, 1988) (copy on file at the Dickinson Law
Review office).
5. The bargaining unit consisted of approximately 400 teachers. Harrisburg Patriot,
Sept. 1, 1988, at Al, col. 1. Between 20-40 of these teachers did not participate in the strike.
Id. at A3, col. 6.
6. The School District sought a temporary restraining order on August 30, 1988, the
first day of the strike. Judge Edgar Bailey denied the School District's request and scheduled a
preliminary injunction hearing for September 2, 1988.
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gar Bailey denied the preliminary injunction on September 2, 1988,
concluding that the issue of whether the Union could strike under
the contract was arbitrable under section 903 of the Pennsylvania
Public Employe Relations Act (PERA);7 therefore, the court had no
jurisdiction over the matter.8
The School District elected not to utilize the permanent replace-
ment option subsequent to the court's denial of the preliminary in-
junction. Instead, the District agreed to enter into factfinding media-
tion on the condition that the teachers would return to work.9 As a
result, the Court of Common Pleas did not decide whether a school
district may permanently replace striking teachers.
Pennsylvania courts and administrative agencies have yet to de-
cide whether the Pennsylvania labor laws permit permanent replace-
ment of striking teachers.1" Private employers have long had the
right to permanently replace employees who strike to obtain bargain-
ing concessions. 1 Although the Pennsylvania Public Employe Rela-
tions Act authorizes certain public employees to engage in strike ac-
tivity after impasse procedures have been exhausted, 2 the PERA
does not indicate whether the public sector employer has the right to
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
8. West Shore School Dist. v. West Shore Educ. Ass'n, No. 22 Eq. 1988 (Cumberland
Co. Sept. 2, 1988). The court may have erred in its determination that it lacked jurisdiction.
The court relied on East Pennsboro v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 78 Pa. Commw. 301,
467 A.2d 1356 (1983). However, Mazzie v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 443, 432 A.2d 985
(1981), and Martino v. Transport Workers Union, 301 Pa. Super. 161, 447 A.2d 292 (1982),
order aftd, 505 Pa. 391, 480 A.2d 242 (1984), held that a status quo injunction may be issued
even though the subject of the injunction is arbitrable. In Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks'
Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that injunctions may be
issued to enforce collective bargaining agreements containing no-strike clauses. Id. at 247-48.
9. Factfinding mediation is a voluntary impasse resolution method provided for by PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1989). The section provides:
If after a reasonable period of negotiation, a dispute or impasse exists be-
tween the representatives of the public employer and the public employes, the
parties may voluntarily submit to mediation but if no agreement is reached be-
tween the parties within twenty-one days after negotiations have commenced,
but in no event later than one hundred fifty days prior to the "budget submission
date," and mediation has not been utilized by the parties, both parties shall im-
mediately, in writing, call in the service of the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Mediation.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
10. It is easy to see why there is little Pennsylvania case law on the replacement issue.
Many employers are hesitant to use the replacement strategy, fearing that the strike may be
deemed an unfair labor practice strike. See infra notes 15-47 and accompanying text. Many
strike settlements provide for an agreement that reinstates strikers. In addition, Pennsylvania
teachers have only enjoyed the limited right to strike since 1970. See infra note 60 and accom-
panying text.
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1978).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.1106 (Purdon Supp. 1989). See also infra
notes 64-76.
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replace lawfully striking public employees. 13 Neither the Pennsylva-
nia Labor Relations Board (PLRB) 14 nor the courts have had occa-
sion to rule on the ability of school districts to replace striking
teachers.
This Comment first reviews the employer's right to replace em-
ployees in the private sector. It then examines the limited right to
strike granted to Pennsylvania teachers by the PERA, and considers
the impact of the Teacher Tenure Act and School Code on the re-
placement issue. This Comment also considers relevant precedents
from other jurisdictions. The Comment concludes that Pennsylvania
law does not prevent school districts from permanently replacing
striking teachers. It also suggests valid policy reasons why school dis-
tricts should utilize permanent replacements during collective bar-
gaining disputes.
II. The Private Employer's Right to Replace Striking Employees
A private sector employer has the right to permanently replace
striking employees, but this right does not exist without qualification.
The employer's right to replace strikers is governed by whether the
work stoppage is deemed to be an economic strike"5 or an unfair
labor practice strike.
16
In NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co.,' 7 the United
States Supreme Court first addressed permanent replacement of
striking workers. The employer hired substitute workers during a
13. The PERA does provide that strikers who disobey a court injunction to return to
work may be discharged. Section 1101.1005 of title 43 provides:
If a public employe refuses to comply with a lawful order of a court of
competent jurisdiction issued for a violation of any of the provisions of this arti-
cle the public employer shall initiate an action for contempt and if the public
employe is adjudged guilty of such contempt, he shall be subject to suspension,
demotion, or discharge at the discretion of the public employer ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1005 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
14. The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board is the state equivalent of the National La-
bor Relations Board. The PLRB is empowered to hear all cases involving unfair labor prac-
tices, and has jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.1301 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
15. "An economic strike is a work stoppage that is not caused or prolonged by an em-
ployer's unfair practices, not in breach of a valid existing contract, and is not for an illegal
purpose." 2 B. WERNE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW & PRACTICE 144 (1966).
16. "An unfair labor practice strike is caused, or prolonged in whole or in part, by em-
ployer unfair practices." Id. A strike will be characterized as an unfair labor practice strikle if
an unfair labor practice precipitated the strike to any degree, even if it was only one of the
causes of the strike. An economic strike may become an unfair labor practice strike if the
employer uses illegal tactics during the course of the strike. See 2 B. WERNE, LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW & PRACTICE 144-45 (1966).
17. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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work stoppage."8 When the strike ended, the employer reinstated
some but not all of the strikers. 19 The Supreme Court noted that
although union members have a statutory right to strike,"0 the em-
ployer does not lose the right to protect and continue the business by
filling places left vacant by striking workers.2' The Court added that
the employer had not violated the law by offering the replacements
permanent employment.22 No employer was "bound to discharge
those hired to fill the places of the strikers, upon the election of the
latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for
them."2"
Since the Supreme Court decided MacKay in 1938, it has been
considered a settled principle of private sector labor law that an em-
ployer may hire permanent replacements in order to keep its busi-
ness in operation, thereby depriving the replaced strikers of an im-
mediate right to reinstatement. 4 This right, however, is limited. The
employer must demonstrate that the replacements are permanent.25
If the replacements are hired on a temporary basis, such as for the
duration of the strike, the economic striker is entitled to reinstate-
18. Id. at 337.
19. Id. at 338-39.
20. Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982),
provides that "[N]othing in [the NLRA], except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as to either interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or
to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982). Public em-
ployers are excluded from the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (employer does not
include a state or its political subdivisions).
21. 304 U.S. at 345.
22. Id. at 346.
23. Id. at 345-46. However, an economic strike is deemed to be protected activity under
§ 7 of the NLRA. While economic strikers may be permanently replaced, they may not be
summarily discharged for engaging in strike activity. See, e.g., NLRB v. U.S. Cold Storage
Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953). It is an unfair labor
practice for a private employer to discharge an employee for engaging in economic strike activ-
ity. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972). This Comment will
not generally discuss the employer's ability to discharge strikers, except when necessary to
clarify the reinstatement position.
24. The courts have consistently upheld this position over the last 52 years. See, e.g.,
Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S.
375 (1967); Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See also Vulcan-Hart Corp. v.
NLRB, 718 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) (indicating that the legal parameters of replace-
ments by employers are well defined). The NLRB has upheld this employer right in a long line
of rulings. See, e.g., Hill Eng'g, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 472 (1968); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146
N.L.R.B. 802 (1964); Northern Crate & Lumber Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 218 (1953); Vogue Lin-
gerie, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1950).
25. See J.E. Stiegerwald Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 483, 492 (1982) (burden of establishing
that replacements were bona fide is upon the employer), and NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc.,
584 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer failed to prove that the replacements were
permanent).
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ment upon an unconditional application to return to work.21 If a va-
cancy exists in an equivalent position, the employer is required to
reinstate the striker in this position. 7 The displaced worker is also
entitled to be placed on a preferential hiring list and given the first
opportunity to fill future openings.1
8
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of permanently
replaced strikers to preferential hiring status in NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co. 29 In Fleetwood, strikers applied for reinstatement at the
end of a strike. 30 Their jobs no longer existed, however, because the
strike's severity caused a cutback in production.31 When full produc-
tion resumed months later, the employer hired new personnel instead
of reinstating the displaced strikers.32 The Court held that "if and
when a job for which a displaced striker is qualified becomes availa-
ble, [the striker] is entitled to an offer of employment."33 Reinstate-
ment can only be avoided if the employer demonstrates "legitimate
and substantial business justifications" for refusing to reinstate the
worker.3 4
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)3 5 refused to limit
the duration of the reinstatement rights of economic strikers who
made an unconditional application for reinstatement.3 6 In Brooks
Research & Manufacturing, Inc.,3 7 the NLRB rejected an em-
ployer's complaint that intolerable burdens would be imposed if the
obligation to seek out former strikers to fill job openings continued
indefinitely.
38
This extended protection of reinstatement rights can be justified
by an examination of the status of displaced strikers. An economic
strike is deemed to be protected activity under section seven of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).39 Consequently, an em-
26. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-51 (1972).
27. Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1972).
28. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
29. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
30. Id. at 376.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 377.
33. Id. at 381.
34. 389 U.S. at 380.
35. The National Labor Relations Board's power and jurisdiction are described in 29
U.S.C. §§ 153-68 (1982).
36. Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 634, 636 (1973). Strikers guilty of
misconduct during a strike, however, need not be reinstated. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallur-
gial Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 252 (1939).
37. 202 N.L.R.B. 634 (1973).
38. Id. at 636.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See, e.g., NLRB v. U.S. Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924,
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ployer cannot discharge an employee for engaging in an economic
strike; it may only permanently replace the striker. Thus, employees
who are not working because of a labor dispute continue to be em-
ployees of their employer.40 A striking employee continues to be an
employee during the strike and only removes himself from labor."1
The striker retains this status at all times and may become a work-
ing employee when the strike is terminated.42 This status affords re-
placed employees the continuing protection of the NLRA.4"
An employer must immediately reinstate all strikers upon ter-
mination of an unfair labor practice strike."" The strikers are entitled
to reinstatement if they unconditionally demand it, even if this en-
tails the dismissal of permanent replacements hired to fill their posi-
tions during the strike. 45 The employer may continue operating dur-
ing the strike by hiring replacements to serve pending the
termination of the strike. When the unfair labor practice strike ends,
the employer must reinstate the strikers to their original positions,
whether or not replacements have been made." By contrast, the em-
ployer may permanently replace the economic striker and is under
no obligation to reinstate the striker immediately or remove the re-
placement worker. 7
The conflict between the workers' right to strike and the em-
ployer's right to permanently replace the workers represents the
pressure and counterpressure left to "the free play of economic
forces."" 8 The union uses the strike weapon as leverage to force de-
mands upon the employer.49 The employer has the right to perma-
nently replace striking workers to keep its operations continuing and
927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
40. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
41. Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson, 506 Pa. 274, 287, 485 A.2d 359, 365 (1984).
42. Id. This status may change, however, if a displaced striker has obtained regular and
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S.
375, 381 (1967).
43. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938). Thus, reinstated
employees are entitled to full employment benefits, including seniority. Globe Molded Plastics
Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1043-44 (1973).
44. NLRB v. Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 637 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1981). This
reinstatement is required because the workers were displaced by an unfair labor practice. Un-
fair labor practice strikes are protected by the NLRA. See generally Comment, Reconversion
of Unfair Labor Practice Strikes to Economic Strikes, 64 GEo. L.J. 1143 (1976).
45. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1942) (right to
reinstatement is unconditional).
46. Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
47. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
48. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 535-36 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. GOLDMAN, LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 268 (1984).
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counter the union pressure.
This mutual economic pressure encourages both sides to seek
accommodation. The union has an incentive to negotiate in good
faith in order to decrease the risk of immediate loss of income during
the strike and the possibility that the employer's business losses or
permanent replacement policy will reduce the number of jobs availa-
ble when the strike ends.50 The employer risks immediate loss of in-
come and future losses due to decreased competitiveness caused by
the strike.51 Although the employer could mitigate income losses by
permanently replacing strikers, this would involve other risks.
Replacements may be limited or untrained. Also, any attempt to
continue operations may increase union hostility.52 The employer,
however, can use the replacement option to counter unreasonable
union militancy. An employer will hire permanent replacements
when there is a total loss of confidence in the union membership.
The employer's loss of confidence in the union leads to a conviction
that the dispute cannot be resolved at the bargaining table.53 Thus,
permanent replacement serves as a check on union abuse, deterring
the exercise of the strike option and consequent increases in indus-
trial strife.54
III. The Right of the Pennsylvania Public Employee to Strike
Until the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Pennsyl-
vania Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), 5 public employees
were absolutely forbidden to strike.56 Traditional doctrine held that
there was "no right to strike in the public sector by anybody, any-
where, anytime. ' 57 A Pennsylvania statute specifically banned public
employee strikes. 58 In 1970, however, the General Assembly deter-
50. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 590, 605 (1985).
51. In order to absorb the cost of giving into union demands, the manufacturer would
increase the price of the goods, which would tend to diminish the employer's ability to compete
effectively. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 11.1, at 240 (2d ed. 1977).
52. Unkovic & Harty, Management's Legal Problems in Continuing Plant Operations
During an Economic Strike Under Federal and Pennsylvania Law, 67 DICK. L. REv. 63, 65
(1962).
53. Id. at 64.
54. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 342 (1976).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
56. PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (Purdon 1964), partially repealed by PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
57. Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611, 614, 88 A.2d 878, 880 (1952).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (Purdon 1964), partially repealed by PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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mined that public employees should be granted a "limited right to
strike" 59 and adopted the PERA.
60
By adopting the Public Employe Relations Act, Pennsylvania
granted to all public employees, except policemen and firemen, the
right to organize and bargain collectively. 61 The PERA established
mediation, factfinding, and arbitration procedures to encourage reso-
lution of collective bargaining disputes.62 The General Assembly be-
lieved that extending a qualified right to strike to public employees
would strengthen this negotiation process.6 3
The PERA provides public employees with the right to strike.
This grant, however, contains substantial limitations." Only those
state and local employees who meet the definition of public employ-
ees and who are not specifically precluded from striking by the
PERA are permitted to strike.65 The PERA does not permit strikes
by prison guards, guards at mental hospitals, and employees directly
involved with and necessary to the functioning of the courts of
59. The Governor's Commission used this phrase to characterize the proposed right to
strike. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LAW OF PENNSYLVA-
NIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1968) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2203 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
61. The Collective Bargaining by Police and Firemen's Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 99
217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1989), controls the collective bargaining process for policemen and
firemen.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.801-.807 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
63. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 13.
64. Twelve states currently allow strikes by public employees. Nine states authorize pub-
lic employee strikes by statute: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
89-12 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1617 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179A.18 (West Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D) (Baldwin 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § I11.70(4)(I) (West 1988). Califor-
nia, Idaho, and Montana allow public sector strikes under their common law. See County
Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835,
214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985); Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99
Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978); Department of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Coun-
cil, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989). The PERA defines
public employee as:
[Alny individual employed by a public employer but shall not include
elected officials, appointees of the Governor with the advice and consent of the
Senate as required by law, management level employes, confidential employes,
clergymen or other persons in a religious profession, employes or personnel at
church offices or facilities when utilized primarily for religious purposes and
those employes covered under the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. Ill), entitled
"An act specifically authorizing collective bargaining between policemen and
firemen and their public employers; providing for arbitration in order to settle
disputes, and requiring compliance with collective bargaining agreements and
findings of arbitrators."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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Pennsylvania."
Additionally, those employees permitted to strike under the stat-
ute do not have an unlimited right to do so. Public employees may
not strike until mandatory impasse procedures are utilized and ex-
hausted. 67 These impasse procedures include mediation and factfind-
ing. 8 If the impasse continues after a reasonable negotiation period,
the parties may voluntarily submit to mediation.69 If the impasse is
not resolved within a specified period of time and the parties have
not voluntarily resorted to mediation, the parties must submit the
issue to mediation.70
Once mediation is commenced, it continues until the parties
reach an agreement.71 If the parties do not reach an agreement
within a specified time, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
(PLRB) has the discretion to continue mediation, appoint a factfind-
ing panel, or terminate mediation. If the PLRB orders mediation
or establishes a factfinding panel, public employees must exhaust
these remedies before striking. 7 During this time the parties may
voluntarily agree to submit the issue to binding arbitration. 7' Once
the parties have exhausted the impasse procedures, the public em-
ployees are permitted to strike unless or until the "strike creates a
clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of
the public."
75
If the school district believes that the strike is outside the lim-
ited right to strike, it may seek an injunction in the court of common
pleas in which the strike occurs.76 Unfortunately, this statutory
check against union abuse of the right to strike has proven illusory.
Pennsylvania courts have indicated that the normal incidents of a
strike do not constitute a "clear and present danger. '77 The confu-
sion, disruption, inconvenience, and added costs normally associated
with a strike will not ordinarily justify the issuance of an injunc-
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1010 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
68. Id. § 1101.801-.802.
69. Id. § 1101.801.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 1101.802.
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802 (Purdon Supp. 1989). For an interpretation of
this provision, see Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Bellefonte Area School
Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
75. Id. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
76. Id.
77. Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw.
463, 467, 322 A.2d 767, 769 (1974).
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tion.7' If the normal incidents of a teacher strike accumulate to a
great extent, continue for a long period of time, or are aggravated by
some unexpected event, however, the public health, safety, and wel-
fare might be endangered.7
In order to determine whether an injunction is warranted,
courts consider factors such as the population percentage affected by
the strike, the risk that government funds will be lost, the effects of
program loss on the community, and potential or actual violence dur-
ing the strike.80 No clear standards exist to determine exactly how
long a strike may continue. Moreover, school boards are reluctant to
seek injunctions because many judges simply order extensive negoti-
ation sessions instead of enjoining the strike. 1 Whether the strike is
legal or illegal, serious obstacles exist to obtaining timely
injunctions.' 2
These statutory remedies have failed to limit strikes in Pennsyl-
vania. Statistics compiled by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Labor Re-
lations indicate that injunctions were obtained in only five of the
forty-six illegal strikes by state employees between 1972 and 1977."1
Injunctions were obtained in two of the four legal strikes. 84 This is
particularly troubling in view of the high incidence of teacher strikes
in Pennsylvania. Since the PERA was enacted in 1970, there have
been over 600 teacher strikes in Pennsylvania." From 1970 until
1985, Pennsylvania had a staggering total of 22.9 percent of school
strikes in the entire nation.86
78. See Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 386, 291
A.2d 120, 125 (1972).
79. Id.
80. The courts of Pennsylvania have suggested several criteria to be used in determining
the level of risk to the health, safety, and welfare of the public. See Bristol Township Educ.
Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974) (percent-
age of the population denied education); Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5
Pa. Commw. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972) (danger of loss of state subsidies to district);
Blackhawk School Dist. v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 665 (C.P. Beaver Co.
1976) (special segments of the community affected). For other factors, see generally Decker,
The Right to Strike for Pennsylvania's Public Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ramifica-
tions for the Public Employer, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 755 (1978-79).
81. REPORT OF THE SENATE TASK FORCE ON ACT 195 22 (1983-84).
82. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 29 (June 1, 1978) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S STUDY
COMMISSION].
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id.
85. Harrisburg Patriot, Sept. 4, 1983, at D1, col. 1.
86. Pennsylvania School Boards Association, 23 Information Legislative Service 2, 4
(chart 8) (Aug. 30, 1985) (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
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IV. The Replacement Option in the Public Sector
The PERA does not provide public sector employers with an
affirmative right to replace public sector employees during strikes.
The National Labor Relations Act is also silent on the issue of em-
ployee replacement, 87 but the Supreme Court has construed the
NLRA to permit permanent replacement of strikers. 88 This section
reviews the legislative history and language of the PERA, considers
the Pennsylvania Teacher Tenure Act89 and the Pennsylvania School
Code,90 and concludes that nothing in these statutes prevents school
districts from hiring permanent replacements in order to keep
schools functioning during teacher strikes.
A. The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act
The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act granted to
public employees certain rights they had previously been denied,9"
including a limited right to strike. 2 The General Assembly believed
that the limited right to strike would act as a safety valve and would
actually prevent strikes.9" The threat of work stoppage could curb
possible intransigence by public employers during negotiations.94 In
addition, some believed that it was inequitable to forbid public em-
ployees to strike while allowing private employees to do so.9a Accord-
ingly, the General Assembly granted to public employees the right to
strike unless or until that right threatened the health, safety, or wel-
fare of the public. 96
Arguably, allowing public employers to permanently replace
teachers would render the right to strike illusory. School districts
could effectively prevent teachers from exercising the right to strike
by lining up replacement teachers, filling the places of any teachers
87. Public employers are excluded from the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (employer does
not include a state or its political subdivisions).
88. See NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1121 to -1133 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989). The
Teacher Tenure Act is contained within the School Code. See infra note 90.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1-101 to 27-2702 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989).
91. The PERA granted all public employees the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives. It also extended the right to strike after impasse procedures
have been followed. The statutory language was patterned after the NLRA. See Decker, The
Right To Strike for Pennsylvania's Public Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ramifications
for the Public Employer, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 761 (1978-79).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1010 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
93. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 14.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id.
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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who exercised their right to strike.97 The legislature intended that
public employees should have a statutory right to strike, which might
arguably be denied if public employers may permanently replace
strikers.
In addition, the legislature adopted the PERA in order to create
a comprehensive scheme for public employee relations." The PERA
provides specific remedies to public employers in the event that the
public employees exceed the limits of the right to strike. If the strike
goes beyond the legislative grant, the school district may seek an
injunction to force teachers back to work. 9 If the teachers disobey
the injunction, strict penalties may be levied including suspension,
demotion, or discharge at the public employer's discretion. 100 The
PERA generally does not provide the public employer with any rem-
edies in the event of a lawful strike.'0 ' Thus, it could be argued that
the PERA sets forth the exclusive range of remedies available to
public employers. Since replacement is not an option provided to
public employers by the PERA, arguably that remedy should not be
permitted."02
The NLRA also fails to address the permanent replacement is-
sue. The right to permanently replace strikers is not to be found
within the language of the Act. Although the Act states that nothing
in it shall be construed to either interfere with, impede, or diminish
in any way the right to strike,' 03 the Supreme Court has construed
the NLRA to permit the permanent replacement of striking
workers.' 04
The PERA was modeled after the NLRA.'0 Nothing in the
97. The PERA contains protections against this scenario. If the school district purposely
replaces teachers in order to harm the union, the school board would be guilty of an unfair
labor practice. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § l101.1201(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). Public employers,
their agents and representatives may not interfere, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed to employees by the PERA. Id. The Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board could prevent a school district from replacing teachers merely because they exercised
their right to strike. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
98. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 3.
99. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1005 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
101. If the strike threatens the health, safety, or welfare of the public, the strike may be
enjoined. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
102. This argument has not been addressed by any Pennsylvania court. Other compre-
hensive legislative schemes, such as the Landlord-Tenant Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§
250.101 to .554 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1988), have been held to provide exclusive remedies.
See Kuriger v. Cramer, 345 Pa. Super. 595, 498 A.2d 1331 (1985). Similar arguments could
be applied to the PERA.
103. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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PERA indicates that the General Assembly meant to grant public
employees any greater protection than that offered to private em-
ployees by the NLRA; indeed, the opposite is true. One purpose of
the PERA is to provide adequate means to resolve disputes and min-
imize their impacts.1"6 If school districts are not permitted to utilize
permanent replacements, the harmful effects of teacher strikes would
be increased. Moreover, the General Assembly intended to provide
public employees with a "limited" right to strike.
107
An interpretation of the PERA that prevents teacher replace-
ment would turn the Act on its head. Such an interpretation would
provide public employees with greater protection during strikes than
that enjoyed by private employees under the same circumstances.
Nothing in the PERA indicates that the General Assembly meant to
so tie the public employer's hands.108 The General Assembly of
Pennsylvania could rely on over thirty years of case law interpreting
employer's rights under the NLRA.1 9 If the General Assembly de-
sired to limit the public employer's response to a legal strike, it could
have easily provided such a limitation in the PERA. Indeed, one pro-
vision of the statute specifically provides that nothing in the PERA
would "impair the employer's right to hire employees or to discharge
106. The purpose of the PERA is set forth in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989). This section provides:
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania declares that
it is the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this act to pro-
mote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employes subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this
Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and wel-
fare. Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its employes are inju-
rious to the public and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate
means must be established for minimizing them and providing for their resolu-
tion. Within the limitations imposed upon the governmental processes by these
rights of the public at large and recognizing that harmonious relationships are
required between the public employer and its employes, the General Assembly
has determined that the overall policy may best be accomplished by (I) granting
to public employes the right to organize and choose freely their representatives;
(2) requiring public employers to negotiate and bargain with employe organiza-
tions representing public employes and to enter into written agreements evidenc-
ing the result of such bargaining; and (3) establishing procedures to provide for
the protection of the rights of the public employe, the public employer and the
public at large.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp, 1989),
107. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5.
108. The opposite is true. The PERA provides public employees less protection during
strikes than that enjoyed by private employees. The PERA provides only a "limited right to
strike." See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
109. The Supreme Court decided MacKay Radio in 1938. A long line of subsequent
cases has firmly established the employer's permanent replacement rights. See supra note 24
and accompanying text.
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them for just cause consistent with existing legislation.' ' l
Pennsylvania courts have never interpreted the PERA to pro-
vide exclusive remedies to public employers."1 Pennsylvania courts
have acknowledged the continuing viability of remedies beyond those
created by the statute. In Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Lo-
cal No. 3 v. Board of Education of the School District of Philadel-
phia,' 12 the court noted that the courts could enforce remedies that
lay beyond the scope of the PERA." 3 Thus, employees who breach
their collective bargaining contracts by engaging in a wildcat strike
permitted by the PERA may still be discharged by an employer." 4
The argument that the PERA provides the only remedies available
to a public employer is therefore unpersuasive.
It also appears unlikely that the Pennsylvania courts would
render the right to strike illusory by allowing public employers to
exercise the permanent replacement option. If the conditions of the
PERA are met," 5 employees may strike. The legislature enacted the
PERA in order to grant public employees this right. The General
Assembly did not intend, however, to prevent employers from mini-
mizing the effects of such strikes. The General Assembly provided
adequate protections in the statute to prevent school districts from
utilizing permanent replacements unfairly." 6 If permanent replace-
ment is allowed under Pennsylvania law, public employees would be
allowed to exercise their right to strike while the right of the em-
ployer to keep operations running would be preserved.
B. The Teacher Tenure Laws
Pennsylvania teachers are protected by the Teacher Tenure
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.706 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
111. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112. 438 Pa. 342, 327 A.2d 47 (1974).
113. Id. at 345 n.3, 327 A.2d at 49 n.3.
114. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Fortiner, 395 Pa. 247, 254-55, 150 A.2d 122,
126-27 (1959). Cf. Hollinger v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 469 Pa. 358, 365 n.10, 365 A.2d
1245, 1249 n.10 (1976).
115. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Legal strikes can
only be enjoined when the public's health, safety, or welfare are threatened. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Equity courts may enjoin illegal strikes. See
Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970). For examples of strikes
that would be illegal under the PERA, see generally Decker, The Right to Strike for Pennsyl-
vania's Public Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ramifications for the Public Employer, 17
DUQ. L. REV. 761 (1978-79); see also notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
116. The use of the permanent replacement option to deliberately attempt to discourage
union support would be an unfair labor practice. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The PLRB is authorized to prevent such unfair practices. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.1301 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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Act,' 17 in addition to the protections afforded them by the PERA.
By design, teacher tenure laws provide that employees retain full
employment status unless and until they commit an act that consti-
tutes cause for revoking that status. The Pennsylvania teacher tenure
laws generally impose significant constraints on the freedom of Penn-
sylvania school districts to make personnel moves such as discharges,
replacements, and transfers."' 8 This section reviews the Teacher
Tenure Act to determine if this law limits the school district's ability
to respond to a strike by hiring permanent replacements.
Arguably, the provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act preclude
school districts from permanently replacing teachers because strike
activity is not among the reasons that constitute cause for a school
district to replace or discharge teachers. The General Assembly
adopted the Teacher Tenure Act in 1937."1 In order to preserve the
educational employment system from arbitrary interference, the
Teacher Tenure Act removed the school board's discretionary power
to remove employees without cause. 20 The statute was designed to
"maintain an adequate . . . teaching staff, free from political and
. . arbitrary interference, whereby capable and competent teachers
might feel secure and more efficiently perform their duty of
instruction.''
Three provisions of the Tenure Act may affect the permanent
replacement of striking teachers: the discharge, suspension, and sub-
stitute teacher provisions. The discharge provision of the Teacher
Tenure Act provides that the only valid causes for termination of a
teacher's contract are "immorality, incompetency, intemperance,
cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement, advocation of or
participating in un-American or subversive doctrines, [or] persistent
and willful violation of the school laws of [the] Commonwealth
.... 122 Pennsylvania courts have held that these enumerated rea-
sons are the exclusive allowable reasons for discharging teachers.'23
This list does not appear to include participation in a teacher
strike. 24 Under federal law, striking employees cannot be discharged
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1121 to -1133 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989).
118. See id. §§ 11-1122 to 11-1124.
119. See Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 217, 197 A. 344, 349 (1938).
120. id. at 222, 197 A. at 351.
121. Sporie v. Eastern Westmoreland Area Vocational Technical School, 47 Pa.
Commw. 390, 394, 408 A.2d 888, 891 (1979).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Purdon 1962).
123. See, e.g., Neshaminy Fed'n of Teachers v. Neshaminy School Dist., 501 Pa. 534,
547, 462 A.2d 629, 636 (1983); West Shore School Dist. v. Bowman, 48 Pa. Commw. 104,
113, 409 A.2d 474, 479-80 (1979).
124. Arguably, however, a teacher strike might be considered dischargeable conduct.
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for exercising their right to strike. 125 The discharge provision of the
Teacher Tenure Act simply reinforces this accepted labor doctrine.
Thus, the school district cannot terminate teachers' contracts during
a strike.
The discharge provisions, however, do not address the basic the-
ory of permanent replacement. Teachers' employment contracts are
not terminated when teachers are permanently replaced. The teach-
ers' employment contract rights would be preserved while they are
absent from labor.126 The teachers would be entitled to reinstatement
upon the next available opening. 127 The discharge provision does not
directly conflict with the permanent replacement option.
The suspension and substitute provisions of the Teacher Tenure
Act1 21 come into more direct conflict with the replacement theory.
Under the Teacher Tenure Act, a suspension is an impermanent sep-
aration, and is considered a furlough or layoff.129 Teachers who have
been permanently replaced during a strike may argue that they
should be treated as suspended teachers.130 Although the employer-
employee relationship continues, the teachers will not be able to
work or receive compensation until a new position becomes available.
Persistent and willful failure to report to work constitutes grounds for dismissal. See Johnson
v. United School Dist. Joint School Bd., 201 Pa. Super. 375, 101 A.2d 897 (1963) (teacher's
refusal to attend an open house, though required and repeatedly told to do so, constituted a
persistent and willful violation of the school laws). Refusal to accept a work assignment was a
ground for dismissal in Wesenberg v. School Dist. of City of Bethlehem, 148 Pa. Super. 250,
256, 24 A.2d 673, 676 (1942). Additionally, violations of school board resolutions are grounds
for dismissal. See Fink v. Board of Educ., 65 Pa. Commw. 320, 442 A.2d 837 (1982). How-
ever, this position would directly conflict with the teacher's statutory right to strike. In addi-
tion, the school board's motivation for requiring teachers to report to work would be suspect.
This argument would allow the school board to discharge teachers engaged in illegal strike
activity. Discharged teachers would be entitled to a hearing under the Teacher Tenure Act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (Purdon 1962). '
125. It is an unfair labor practice for a private employer to discharge an employee for
engaging in a strike. See, e.g., NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 927
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
126. Teachers who strike will not be considered to have repudiated their employment
contracts. Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson, 506 Pa. 274, 295-96, 485 A.2d 359, 370 (1984). The strik-
ing employee retains a reasonable expectation of continued employment during the strike. Id.
When the strike ends, the employee again becomes a working employee. Pramco, Inc. v. Un-
employment Compensation Bd. of Review, 396 Pa. 560, 564, 154 A.2d 875, 877 (1959). A
teacher is under contract with the school district. This contract is permanent unless terminated
in accordance with the provisions of the Tenure Act. A teacher will not be considered to have
resigned the position unless that resignation is in writing. Rice v. Ford, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 543,
551 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. 1954).
127. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967).
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1124 to -1125.1 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989).
129. Norwin School Dist. v. Chlodney, 37 Pa. Commw. 284, 286, 390 A.2d 328, 330
(1978).
130. This argument is more plausible than that based on the discharge provision because
suspended employees retain many of the rights that permanently replaced individuals retain.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § II -1125.1 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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Teachers may argue that they can only be placed in this position for
the reasons listed in the tenure law. The Teacher Tenure Act pro-
vides that the school board can suspend teachers when student en-
rollment declines substantially, school districts are consolidated, or
educational programs are curtailed or altered.' Pennsylvania courts
have held that teachers may not be suspended for other reasons. 13 2 A
suspension for any other reason would be invalid. 33 These categories
do not appear to cover participation in a teacher strike. Thus, teach-
ers who go on strike would be entitled to their positions upon their
return because the school district cannot justify the teacher's re-
moval from employment under the Teacher Tenure Act.
The School Code13' definition of a substitute teacher further
supports this position. The term substitute includes any individual
who has been employed to perform the duties of a teacher while the
teacher is absent from work due to a sabbatical leave or for any
other legal cause authorized and approved by the school board."3 5
When a vacancy occurs because a teacher is on leave but expected to
return, a temporary vacancy exists that may only be filled by a sub-
stitute teacher.136 A teacher hired to fill a position to which a regular
teacher fully intends to return can only be classified as a substitute
because a bona fide vacancy does not exist. 3 7 Thus, the Teacher
Tenure Act definition would appear to permit only the hiring of tem-
porary replacements, and to forbid the hiring of permanent
replacements.
These tenure provisions, however, were not intended to grant
teachers the right to permanently retain their positions and pay re-
gardless of need for their services or interference with the control of
school policy.138 The legislature did not intend to grant teachers any
rights beyond those reasonably necessary to effect the general pur-
poses of the law. 1 9 The tenure law must be construed in light of
13 1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1124 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989).
132. Cigarski v. Lake Lehman School Dist., 46 Pa. Commw. 297, 299-300, 407 A.2d
460, 461 (1979) (citing Theros v. Warwick Bd. of School Directors, 42 Pa. Commw. 296, 401
A.2d 579 (1979)).
133. Hixson v. Greater Latrobe School Dist., 52 Pa. Commw. 92, 95, 421 A.2d 474, 476
(1980).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1-101 to 27-2702 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989).
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
136. Love v. Redstone Township School Dist., 375 Pa. 200, 100 A.2d 55 (1953).
137. Tyrone Area Educ. Ass'n v. Tyrone Area School Dist., 24 Pa. Commw. 483, 356
A.2d 871 (1976).
138. Ehret v. School Dist. of Borough of Kulpment, 333 Pa. 518, 524, 5 A.2d 188, 191
(1939).
139. Coble v. School Dist. of Metal Township, 178 Pa. Super. 301, 307, 116 A.2d 113,
116-17 (1955).
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Pennsylvania's constitutional requirement that the General Assembly
should provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient school system.""
The School Code permits school boards to exercise vast discre-
tion with regard to personnel decisions. The school boards have the
power to employ the necessary professional employees, substitutes,
and temporary employees to keep the public schools open in their
respective districts."' The school board has the right and power to
determine how to fill all vacancies in the teaching staff." 2 A school
board could present several justifications for using permanent
replacements instead of substitute teachers. A school board might
prefer permanent replacements because of financial considerations,
or because it cannot acquire adequate personnel on a temporary ba-
sis."" Ordinarily, courts will not interfere with the school boards'
exercise of discretion in performing their functions; when the boards'
actions are challenged, the burden of proof rests upon those chal-
lenging the board's authority.""'
Any analysis must consider that the tenure laws were adopted
before public employees were given the right to bargain collec-
tively." 5 The General Assembly that passed the Teacher Tenure Act
could not have envisioned that public employees would one day be
given the right to strike."'6 It is doubtful that the courts would apply
the tenure provisions in the labor dispute context because the
Teacher Tenure Act's provisions were not intended to apply to such
circumstances. The Pennsylvania courts have not had occasion to
consider this issue. Other jurisdictions that have considered whether
teacher tenure laws apply in the labor dispute context, have con-
cluded that those protections were not intended to extend to labor
disputes." 7 One jurisdiction has clearly ruled that teachers who en-
140. Ehret, 333 Pa. at 525, 5 A.2d at 192 (1939).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1106 (Purdon 1962).
142. Hetrick v. School Dist. of Sunbury, 335 Pa. 6, 11, 6 A.2d 279, 281 (1939).
143. The school district may have to continue paying peripheral personnel, such as bus
drivers, administrative personnel, or janitors, for which the school district receives a dimin-
ished value unless school can continue in session. In addition, substitutes may require addi-
tional training. If the school district can demonstrate legitimate and substantial business rea-
sons, displaced strikers may not be entitled to the next available job either. See NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967).
144. Hetrick, 335 Pa. at 11, 6 A.2d at 282.
145. The PERA established the right to bargain collectively in 1970. The Teacher Ten-
ure Act was adopted in 1937.
146. Until the PERA was adopted in 1970, public employees could not legally strike.
147. See Board of Trustees of Billings School Dist. No. 2 of Yellowstone County v.
State, 185 Mont. 104, 604 P.2d 778 (1979) and Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975).
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gage in strikes may be permanently replaced, while a second has
suggested that permanent replacement of teachers is permissible.
C. Permanent Replacement of Teachers in Other Jurisdictions
Two jurisdictions have confronted the issue of permanent re-
placement of striking teachers: Michigan and Montana. In Rockwell
v. Crestwood School District Board of Education,48 the Michigan
Supreme Court stated that public employers have the same right to
replace strikers as their private sector counterparts. 4 ' The court ob-
served that when public employees strike, "the public employer
must, like a private employer, be able to hire employees so that the
public business is not interrupted.' 150 The court noted that "[i]n or-
der to hire competent replacements, it may be necessary for the pub-
lic employer to offer permanent employment and thus displace strik-
ers. When essential services have been suspended, the hiring of
replacements often cannot await time-consuming adjudicatory
processes." 5'
In Rockwell, the court decided that the due process clause did
not require that the strikers receive a hearing before being re-
placed. 52 The court implicitly assumed that the school district had
the right to permanently replace striking teachers.
Michigan teachers are protected by a tenure act very similar to
the Pennsylvania Teacher Tenure Act.153 The court held that the
"Teacher's Tenure Act was not intended, either in contemplation or
design, to cover labor disputes between school boards and their em-
ployees.' 1 54 The court noted that the legislature that enacted the
tenure law in 1937 "could not have anticipated collective bargaining
or intended to provide for the' resolution of labor disputes in public
employment."'11 5 The court added that the purposes of the tenure act
would not be frustrated if the tenure statute were not applied to la-
bor disputes.
56
148. 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975).
149. Id. at 634-35, 227 N.W.2d at 744.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 635, 227 N.W.2d at 744.
152. The teachers were replaced while engaging in an illegal strike. Michigan law pro-
hibits strikes by public employees. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 423.206 (1984).
153. See MicH. COMP. LAWS §§ 38.71-40.10 (1984).
154. Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 393 Mich. 616, 638, 227 N.W.2d
736, 741-42 (1984).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 640, 227 N.W.2d at 743. The court noted that the goals of Michigan's tenure
act "are to 'maintain an adequate and competent staff, free from political and arbitrary inter-
ference' " and to promote good order by preventing the "removal of capable teachers at the
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In Board of Trustees of Billings School District No. 2 of Yel-
lowstone County v. State,157 the Montana Supreme Court did not
question the employer's assertion that it had a right to permanently
replace school teachers engaged in a lawful strike.15 The school dis-
trict sent a letter to striking teachers indicating that they would be
replaced unless they returned to work by a specified date.' 59 The
court relied on cases construing the National Labor Relations Act
and contended that the district had a legal right to permanently re-
place workers. 10 The Montana Supreme Court did not question the
employer's claim 6' even though the Montana Collective Bargaining
Act did not address the replacement issue.
162
The court concluded that the school district committed an un-
fair labor practice.' 63 The court noted, however, that the decision
rested on the school board's failure to hire permanent replacements
after the expiration of the deadline." The court concluded that this
failure revealed that the school district's real motivation for sending
the letter was to halt the strike and not to keep the schools open.' 6 5
If the district had replaced the teachers to keep the schools open,
apparently no unfair labor practice would have been found. The
court assumed that school districts could replace striking employees.
No compelling reasons exist for rejecting the precedents of
other jurisdictions. Those courts that have considered the permanent
replacement issue have decided that teacher tenure laws do not pro-
hibit use of the replacement option.' 6 These states have tenure laws
similar to those of Pennsylvania.167 Those jurisdictions do not apply
tenure laws to public sector labor disputes; nor should Pennsylvania.
D. Constitutional Due Process Concerns
Constitutional concerns may further limit the ability of school
districts to permanently replace striking teachers. When a public
personal whims of changing political office holders." Id. at 639-40, 227 N.W.2d at 742-43.
157. 185 Mont. 104, 604 P.2d 778 (1979).
158. Id. at 109, 604 P.2d at 781.
159. Id. at 106, 604 P.2d at 779.
160. Id. at 109, 604 P.2d at 781.
161. Id.
162. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-101 to -409 (1989).
163. Board of Trustees of Billings School Dist. No. 2 of Yellowstone County v. State,
185 Mont. at 109, 604 P.2d at 781 (1979).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 148-65 and accompanying text.
167. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ I1-1101 to -1132 (Purdon 1962 & Supp.
1989) with MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 38.71-40.10 (1984) and MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-4-203 to
-207 (1989).
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employer acts to affect the employment status of a public employee,
the employer's action is state action for purposes of constitutional
analysis.'68 When the government grants an individual a benefit such
as public employment, it can revoke that benefit only through consti-
tutionally adequate procedures. 9
The United States Supreme Court established a framework. for
evaluating due process claims. In the employment context, it must
first be determined if the employee's interest in the job rises to the
level of a liberty or property interest, thereby invoking the protec-
tions of the due process clause.'7 Second, if the employee enjoys
such an interest, it must be determined how much process is due.'7
The Court noted that to have a property interest in employ-
ment, the employee must have more than a unilateral expectation of
employment; there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.'
These legitimate claims of entitlement are created by rules or under-
standings from an independent source, such as state law. 173 Accord-
ingly, state law is one of the sources that determines the existence
and defines the contours of the employee's interest.
Teacher tenure laws clearly appear to create property interests,
because teachers are guaranteed continued employment unless and
until they are guilty of some wrongdoing. In Perry v. Sinderman,17'
the Court concluded that a property interest could be created by a
university's unwritten personnel policy, if that policy rose to the level
of a de facto tenure policy. 1'" Each Pennsylvania teacher who is cov-
ered by the Teacher Tenure Act has a property interest created by
the Commonwealth's laws. 7 This interest would be threatened to
some degree if the teacher was permanently replaced while on strike.
However, the existence of an employee property interest does not
preclude the employer from taking adverse personnel action. 77 The
168. Monaghan, Of "'Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 407-08
(1977).
169. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Under the four-
teenth amendment, no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
170. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
171. Id.
172. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
173. Id.
174. 408 U.S. 593 (1972),
175. Id. at 600-03.
176. The Teacher Tenure Act provides that teachers are entitled to their positions unless
they commit one of the acts specified by the law. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1101 to -
1132 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1989).
177, The due process requirement does not prevent an employer from taking away the
property interest. The employer may not take the interest away without due process of law.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1990
due process clause merely requires that procedural safeguards be es-
tablished and followed to protect against wrongful taking.178
The Supreme Court resisted the temptation to prescribe appro-
priate procedures in given cases. Instead, the Court indicated that
three factors should be considered to determine whether due process
has been given in a particular case. 179 The Court considers (1) the
extent of the employee's interest; (2) the value of additional proce-
dural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest in avoiding cum-
bersome proceedings. 180 The Court made it clear that state and fed-
eral government agencies do not enjoy the complete freedom to
discharge employees that would be enjoyed by a private employer.' 8'
The Supreme Court's holding in Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill'82 suggests what due process would be required for
permanently replaced teachers. In Loudermill, the Court observed
that a full adversarial hearing prior to termination need not be af-
forded if opportunity exists for a full post-termination hearing.
83
Under the due process clause, however, an employee is entitled to
oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the em-
ployer's evidence, and an opportunity to respond prior to termina-
tion. 18 4 Consequently, it would appear that due process would be sat-
isfied if the school board notifies a striking employee prior to hiring
permanent replacements that the striker must make an unconditional
offer to return to work by a certain date or seek to be heard and
offer reasons why the employee should not be replaced.' 85
Offering pre-replacement notice and an opportunity to be heard
should satisfy the due process requirements set forth in Loudermill.
Permanent replacement of an employee is not tantamount to dis-
The due process clause simply establishes the procedural requirements that must be followed
to protect against wrongful taking. See infra note 178.
178. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972) (essential reason for required
procedure is to protect against erroneous deprivations of property).
179. Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
180. Id.
181. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961).
182. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
183. Id. at 546.
184. Id.
185. This procedure would fit the Loudermill requirements. Replacement does not deny
the employee's property interest. The employee is still entitled to a job when the next vacancy
occurs. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Additionally, the NLRA protects the em-
ployee from unfair labor practices. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. It would also be
illegal at this stage for the employer to fire the employee. See supra note 23 and accompany-
ing text. Therefore, these provisions afford the employee the necessary protections. The letter
provides the employee with notice of the charges and the employer's evidence. In the notice the
employer would also give the employee an opportunity to respond to the charges. See Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
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charge. By alerting the striking teachers to the risks of continued
strike activity and providing them with an opportunity to be heard,
the school district would provide protection against the teachers' loss
of property interests."' 6 In addition, crucial aspects of the teachers'
employment interests, such as seniority and protection from unfair
labor practices, would still be protected under the employee's em-
ployment relationship. 18 7 Thus, the due process clause does not pre-
vent the permanent replacement of striking teachers.
V. Public Policy Justifications for Permitting School Boards to Per-
manently Replace Striking Teachers
A comparison of the characteristics of private and public sector
strikes indicates why permanent replacement should be allowed in
the public sector. The private sector union normally strikes in order
to inflict economic harm on the employer. 188 A strike causes the em-
ployer to lose income by cutting production and, therefore, revenue.
The threat of heavy economic losses induces the employer to concede
to union demands.
Several factors force unions to be moderate in the use of the
strike weapon. If the union acquires unduly high wage levels for its
members, the concessions increase the costs to the employer. These
increased costs are usually absorbed by increasing the price of the
employer's products."8 9 The increased price of the product may cause
consumers to switch to alternative products or cheaper competitors.
Lost profits may be reflected in layoffs or subsequent wage cut-
backs. 190 Additionally, a prolonged strike may lead to increased con-
sumer prices, which would cause the employer to lose profits.' 9 '
The employer, on the other hand, faces immediate losses in rev-
enue and risks losing the ability to compete during prolonged
186. The teachers might also have a claim that they have been deprived of their liberty
interests. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-75 (1972). The Court established a
restricted view of liberty interests since Roth, however. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 420-34 (1977). To establish a violation of a liberty
interest, an employee must show: (1) stigmatization as a result of a discharge process; (2) that
the stigmatization resulted from false charges; (3) that the charges were made public; and (4)
that the employee was denied a meaningful opportunity to clear his name at a hearing. Wells
v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 1983).
187. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
188. See GOLDMAN, LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 224 (1984).
189. WELLINGTON & WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 15-17 (1971).
190. Id.
191. A prolonged strike would cause the employer to lose substantial sums of money. To
cover these losses and the union concessions, the employer will increase the costs of his goods,
thereby stoking the inflationary fire. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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strikes."' 2 This mutual economic pressure normally encourages both
sides to seek accommodation. 193 Occasionally, however, a private
sector union may wield a great deal of bargaining power and may be
willing to force heavy economic losses upon the private sector em-
ployer.194 To counter this pressure, private employers may perma-
nently replace striking workers in order to keep production going.
The employer will normally attempt to keep production going only
when it has lost confidence in the union, or when competitive condi-
tions require continued operation.19 Thus, the permanent replace-
ment option helps to keep bargaining power in balance.
By contrast, public employees do not gain bargaining power by
directly harming the public employer.196 Public sector unions gain
power by depriving the public of necessary services. The demand for
governmental services such as education, unlike that for most con-
sumer goods, is highly inelastic.1 97 The general public cannot obtain
these services from another source.198 Teacher strikes interrupt the
provision of educational services to the community. When education
is not provided, great political pressure is placed upon the school
board.199 If the union can inflict a sufficiently severe interruption in
educational services, pressure will mount on the board members to
settle the dispute. Finally, public employee union members can vote
or not vote as a group, thereby exercising the power of block voting
to influence the public employer.2 00
192. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 590, 605 (1985).
193. Id. at 607.
194. Some unions, such as those representing automobile workers and steel workers, op-
erate in concentrated industries that are very dependent on union cooperation. Such unions can
bargain more effectively than unions in other industries that may have undergone deregulation,
faced anti-union competition, or in which employers may easily relocate to nonunion
jurisdictions.
195. Unkovic & Harty, Management's Legal Problems in Continuing Plant Operations
During an Economic Strike Under Federal and Pennsylvania Law, 67 DICK. L. REv. 63, 64
(1968).
196. Public employers are insulated from direct hardships. Economic losses may drive
private employers out of business. By contrast, the school board members will remain in their
elected offices regardless of the direct economic effects of a strike. Public employee strikes
affect the school boards by causing the community at large to pressure the individual mem-
bers. This mounting pressure placed on members by angry parents pressures the school board
to make concessions. Cf. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee
Strikes, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 590, 603-15 (1985).
197. Although there are private schools throughout the United States, most families find
them unaffordable. Most Americans have little choice but to rely on the public education
system.
198. WELLINGTON & WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 18 (1971).
199. Decker, The Right to Strike for Pennsylvania's Public Employees-Its Scope,
Limits, and Ramifications for the Public Employer, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 755, 759 (1978-79).
200. See Dalton, A Theory of the Organization of State and Local Government Em-
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Public sector labor unions also have fewer incentives to moder-
ate their bargaining positions and use of strikes. A public union that
acquires a substantial wage increase need not worry that the em-
ployer will lose its competitive edge. The cost of wage settlements
can be buried in larger government budgets and paid out of general
taxes.2 0 1 In addition, no matter how expensive education becomes,
the public usually feels that it must maintain at least a level of ser-
vice sufficient to guarantee quality education."'
Teachers enjoy significant economic strengths not enjoyed by
private sector employees. When private sector employees decide to
strike, they face the prospect of losing pay for the duration of the
strike. Pennsylvania teachers may actually recoup much of their lost
wages. The Commonwealth is required to provide its students with
an instructional period of 180 days.203 The occurrence of a teacher
strike will not necessarily excuse failure to meet this requirement. 4
In this respect, teachers are able to receive their full salaries because
teachers' annual pay is usually based upon the completion of a mini-
mum academic year.20 5 School boards must be able to permanently
replace striking teachers in order to counter the great bargaining ad-
vantages of these public employees.
Because the government is essentially the sole supplier of educa-
tional services, teacher strikes deny educational services to the com-
munity. Because of this denial of public services, public employers
should have a greater right to replace workers than private sector
employers. In the private sector bargaining context, the interests of
two parties, the employee and the employer, must be reconciled. In
public sector bargaining, there exists an additional party: the public.
The public employer has additiohal responsibility as the sole supplier
of essential public services. 6
ployees, 3 J. LAB. RES. 163, 165 (1982).
201. WELLINGTON & WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 17-21 (1971).
202. Id.
203. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (Purdon Supp. 1989). This section provides:
All public kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools shall be kept
open each school year for at least one hundred eighty (180) days of instruction
for pupils. No days on which the schools are closed shall be counted as days
taught, and no time shall be counted as a pupil session for any activity to which
admission is charged. Unless otherwise provided in this act, the board of school
directors in any district or joint board may keep such other schools or depart-
ments as it may establish open during such time as it may direct.
204. Scanlon v. Mount Union Area Bd. of School Directors, 51 Pa. Commw. 83, 89-90,
415 A.2d 96, 99 (1980), ajfTd, 499 Pa. 215, 452 A.2d 1016 (1982).
205. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 82, at 28.
206. The Pennsylvania Constitution requires school districts to establish and maintain a
thorough and efficient system of education. The government cannot feasibly provide educa-
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In Pennsylvania, the state constitution requires the school
boards to provide the citizens of the Commonwealth with a thorough
and efficient system of education. 0 By disrupting the educational
process, teacher strikes interfere with the students' constitutionally
guaranteed right to an education.""e The teachers' right to strike
must be subject to the paramount right of the citizens to an ade-
quate education. 0 9
Prolonged strikes have extremely detrimental effects on stu-
dents. Studies have linked decreased student achievement and devel-
opment to organizational conflict between teachers and school
boards.2 10 Conflict between the school board and teachers creates
stress and a negative climate for students.211 Studies have indicated
a negative effect on overall student attitudes as a result of the length
and overall timing of teachers strikes.212
School boards must be allowed to hire permanent replacements
in order to limit the effects of teacher strikes upon the community.
Judicious use of this option will mitigate the effects of strikes and
the threat of replacement will buffer union bargaining power and
minimize the incidence of strikes.
VI. Conclusion
Private sector employers have long enjoyed the right to hire per-
manent replacements for economic strikers. Integral to the collective
bargaining process is the exertion of economic pressure by employers
and unions against each other to achieve bargaining objectives. The
conflict between the worker's right to strike and the private em-
ployer's ability to replace striking workers represents the pressure
and counterpressure of free market forces. Generally, the replace-
ment option has helped unions and employers seek accommodation
and reduce the incidence of strikes.
Like other public employees, teachers have been granted many
new rights, suh as the limited right to strike, in the past two de-
tional services without public employees. Other public departments could conceivably hire pri-
vate firms to perform work previously done by the public employees. For an interesting exam-
ple of such a strategy, see Willimatic, Conn., Fire Personnel Take Cuts to Beat Out Private
Firm, 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 863 (Apr. 18, 1983).
207. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
208. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 82, at 31 (minority
recommendation).
209. Id. at 32.
210. REPORT OF THE SENATE TASK FORCE ON ACT 195 22 (1983-84).
211. Id.
212. Caldwell & Moskalski, The Effects of School District Strikes on Student Achieve-
ment, 2 GOV'T UNION REV. 4-6 (Fall 1981).
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cades. This right to strike is a significant weapon for teachers. In
many respects the teachers' bargaining position is actually stronger
than that of private sector employees. In addition, the effects of
teacher strikes are far more harmful to the general public. These
risks loom even larger as teachers' unions become more militant.
Pennsylvania school boards should be able to permanently re-
place striking teachers in order to counter union bargaining strength.
Nothing in the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, the
Teacher Tenure Act, the School Code, or the United States Consti-
tution prevents a school district from hiring permanent replacements
for teachers who engage in strike activity. Limited use of such an
option would encourage both sides to seek accommodation. Thus,
permanent replacements might both mitigate the effects of strikes
upon the community and reduce the incidence of strike activity.
Ronald L. Daugherty

